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‘‘Justice and Conflicts’’ covers an ambitious and wide-ranging selection of topics.
The volume covers theoretical issues like how to define justice, which factors
mediate responses to injustice, and what potential responses to injustice are. The
volume illustrates these theoretical issues with many empirical examples in diverse
areas including: environmental conflicts, genocide, conspiracy theories, marital
conflict, penal punishment, and employee–employer relationships. The greatest
challenge in compiling such a broad selection of articles is to build a cohesive
thread that makes it clear to the reader what these diverse topics have in common
with respect to justice and conflict theory.
The book begins with two theoretical chapters on the definition of justice and
conflict (Montada, To¨rnblom, and Kazemi). The authors explain that conflict occurs
among multiple actors (or within a single actor), and generally stems from
incompatible ideas, beliefs, preferences, or demands. Justice conflicts, in particular,
are conflicts between equally valid yet incompatible principles. Take, for example,
the question of distributional justice. It is equally valid to believe that people should
be rewarded based on effort, performance, ability, or need. Nevertheless,
distributing rewards according to one principle excludes the others. As such,
justice conflicts are solved by negotiating compromises between the different
principles. For example, in the case of distributional justice, one might assign
different weights to each principle. There are many examples of competing, yet
equally valid principles. Many people simultaneously believe in equal opportunity,
equal treatment, and (to some extent) equal results, but the three inevitably
contradict each other. Equal treatment can result in unequal outcomes based on
various other factors (like ability).
Contradictory, yet equally valid principles are the source of conflict around the
most controversial public policies. For example, affirmative action targets two sorts
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of justice: reparations for past harms and future equal outcomes. At the same time
affirmative action also clearly and intentionally violates the principles of equal
treatment and opportunity. The theoretical chapters argue that competing principles
makes justice conflicts unavoidable.
The idea of a justice conflict is very broad, and as such, To¨rnblom and Kazemitry
to make the idea more coherent by creating a parsimonious typology of 13 types of
distributional justice conflicts, plus 14 subtypes. For example, they clarify the
difference between a ‘‘Justice-Principle Determinant Conflict,’’ a ‘‘Justice Subprin-
ciple Conflict, ’’and a ‘‘Justice-Goal Conflict.’’This typology offers clearly defined
characteristics that can be used to categorize a given empirical conflict. Used
appropriately this could provide keen insight into countless real-world phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the other authors in the volume do not explicitly draw on the
classification’s insights in their own chapters. Certainly future work will use this
classification to dissect meaning from complex empirical examples of justice
conflicts. The authors promise that in future work they will tackle the task of
creating a typology for other types of justice conflict beyond distribution, such as
allocation, or interactional justice conflicts. These typologies for additional sub-
areas of justice conflicts will surely simplify a very complex issue, and future
volumes are eagerly awaited.
Given that ‘‘justice’’ has a different meaning based on the contradictory yet
equally valid principles, its meaning is rather contextual, depending on the
individual characteristics of those in the conversation, their joint characteristics,
cultural–historical context and the situational context. Various authors in the
volume underscore that justice is something to be negotiated through a social
discourse. At one extreme, Goldschmidt and Lenger state that the norms of justice
vary by culture and by identity to such an extent that one cannot even consider
justice independently of culture. In contrast, authors referencing quantitative survey
research (Thomas et al., Mikula, or Fischer) are forced by necessity to engage with
simpler broader, objective-seeming definitions.
The problem of defining justice through a social discourse is complicated by the
fact that even the parties’ understanding of how they will interact or the goals of the
interaction can vary. This problem is investigated in detail in the chapter on
international negotiations and climate change (Ittner & Ohl). The authors argue that
different countries view the interaction of treaty negotiation differently. According
to the authors, interactions could potentially be classified as various sorts of games
(e.g., chicken, hare/stag). The fact that each party engages in a different game with
different goals makes it difficult to even engage in conversation, never mind come
to a compromise.
One of the key issues that arise throughout the book is the question of scope.
There are two aspects of scope in justice conflicts. First is the scope of the discourse
used to define justice and the second is the scope of application of that definition.
The question of scope is first explored from an empirical and historical perspective,
using the Berlin Holocaust Museum. This approach works well because it begins
with an extreme example of how limited scope is in itself unfair and can violate
justice principles, and then use this as a launching pad to talk about more subtle and
modern questions of scope and when and if they are unjust. When the authors first
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pose the question of scope in the context of the Holocaust, the reader’s immediate
gut reaction is that scope is infinitely broad; in a just world everyone is included in
both the construction of a definition of justice and its application. But as we read
further, it is clear that the authors are raising a more nuanced point. Are we willing
to allocate community resources to equally to everyone in the world? Are we
willing to sacrifices our own welfare to help everyone in the world? The answer is
clearly ‘‘no,’’ and so this raises the question of what is the scope for which aspects
of justice? Do we limit scope based on ethnicity? Geography? Do we normalize
exclusion by defining the other as pathological? Inferior? Criminal? Evil? The
ultimate question is which limitations of scope are, ultimately, unjust?
Of course scope is not static. The scope in terms of definition is based on the size
of the community of discourse; the scope of just distribution is usually based on
political geography or institutions like employers or unions. Scope also depends on
the sort of justice we are talking about. For certain basic definitions (e.g., human
rights) most of us believe scope should be infinitely broad, while for others (e.g.,
sharing risk such as in an unemployment insurance pool) most of us believe the
scope of justice can be smaller. The scope of both the definition and application of
fairness and justice also varies over time. It changes as political boundaries change,
as media broadens the social conversation, or as the authors point out, as new groups
that were once the other cultural assimilate.
When the scope of justice changes in the future, our future selves will see today
unjust. How do we then assess our future guilt and responsibility for our past
exclusion or narrow scope? The authors begin with the case of the Holocaust and
how to deal with that history today, but again link it to the general questions of
reparations, and assessing and rectifying past injustices. Using the Holocaust as a
starting point both within the chapter and as a first chapter in the book, was a nice
approach in that while the Holocaust is a clear example of gross injustice, the way
we understand it and interpret it today carries a great relevance for other, more
nuanced, justice conflicts.
Two specific types of justice come up repeatedly throughout the book:
distributional and procedural justice. Distributional justice is how resources are
distributed within some group. There are many competing principles for distribu-
tional justice such as equality, equity, need, desserts, and effort. Bierhoff &
Rohmann concentrate specifically on the principles of equity versus equality,
reporting that younger children tend to believe more in the equality principle while
older children shift to equity. These authors argue for compensation systems based
on a combination of equity and equality, which is, of course, what many company
pay systems already look like today, with workers receiving a base pay based on
rank and experience (equality) plus an additional incentive payment based on
productivity (equity). Other chapters take an more oppositional approach to the
equity principle, with Goldschmidt & Lenger arguing that market outcomes are
necessarily unjust, as they distribute based only on one criteria, productivity, while
most people’s conception of distributional justice are based on multiple criterion.
Mu¨ller’s chapter on ecological justice agrees, proposing that it would be unjust to
strictly use the market to distribute environmental goods. For example, under an
international carbon-trading scheme, a western yacht company might be able to
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afford to pollute while a poor countries’ agricultural producers could not. Many
people would find it ‘‘unjust’’ for the yacht company to keep producing yachts for
the rich while the poor countries starve. While the authors of various chapters do not
come to any concrete conclusion, they all seem to agree that distributional justice
entails a compromise, adhering simultaneously to diverse principles.
Procedural justice is discussed throughout the book, but the theme is treated in
less detail, presumably because the criteria for procedural justice are extremely
context-specific. Perhaps the primary point of agreement is that procedural justice
generally has something to do with inclusion in the decision-making process and
transparency. Although authors refrain from explicitly defining procedural justice,
they do discuss its important consequences. For example, authors highlight its role
in generating acceptance of unequal distributions, in promoting cooperation within
an organization or with an employer, or in bolstering respect for and trust in
authorities.
Given that there has been a justice conflict, and in retrospect it is agreed that
some injustice was committed, the question of how to restore or rectify justice
arises. Several articles deal with this question in different contexts, starting with
Opotow’s article on the Holocaust. In the context of the penal system there are
different competing principles of why we punish. Should punishment rebalance the
moral scale? Should punishment prevent greater evil? Or is punishment a restorative
process? A forward-looking preventative or a rehabilitative view or a restorative
process focusing on truth, reconciliation, and inclusion might be viewed as more
idealistic. Nevertheless, Gollwitzer et al. describe research showing that people tend
to take a less generous view, preferring punishment to focus on adjusting the moral
scale and giving people their ‘‘just desserts.’’ In other words, most people see the
appropriate response to past injustices to be exclusive, backward-looking and
retributory, rather than inclusive, forward-looking, and constructive. This comes
back to a theme arising in many of the chapters; people wish to believe that the
world is just, and that outcomes should correlate with actions. To fulfill this belief
they can pursue the principles of justice, ignore injustices in the world, or in the case
of punishment, take action to enforce a regime of just desserts.
Dealing with past injustices is a central issue in those chapters on the
environment. These sections deal with the same theoretical issues as those in a penal
system: should responses to past environmental injustice focus on the future (e.g.,
mitigation policies such as carbon trading with carbon vouchers distributed based on
population) or should responses focus on the past (e.g., punishing those countries
that had polluted in the past with fines used to fund climate adaption projects, like
dams, in poor countries disproportionately affected by environmental damage)?
Interestingly, in this case, the author (Mu¨ller) seems to take a perspective slightly
different than that in the chapter on the penal system. In the penal system example
we are left with the impression that the authors think the general population
(unfairly) wants to focus on the past and not constructively focus on the future. In
the environmental justice chapter we are left with the impression that the authors
believe that the general population (unfairly) wants to start with a clean slate,
perhaps implementing a carbon-trading scheme with vouchers distributed based on
population while the author thinks this must be augmented with some additional
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form of reparations, such as the West paying for environmental projects. In other
words, in the chapter on the penal system the authors find strictly backwards looking
resolutions unjust, and in the environmental chapter the authors find strictly forward
looking resolutions unjust. What the two chapters do agree on is that in all cases
resolutions must to take a compromise view, looking both forward and backward.
‘‘Justice and Conflicts’’ also deals with reactions to injustice and a lack of
fairness that simply perpetuate injustice. Prooijen discusses how conspiracy theories
are more likely when people do not have faith in the fairness of institutions while
Furnham and Siegel examine how organizational sabotage is more likely when
employees perceive their organizations to be unjust.
Of course, reactions to injustice are not only negative; Osswald et al. explore the
individual and situational characteristics that lead people to react to injustice with
moral courage.
What leads to a negative or positive reaction to injustice? Thomas et al. nicely
outline the intermediating characteristics that might lead one to react (negatively
or positively) to injustice, including one’s perception of, emotional reaction to, or
contemplation about injustice, as well as the individual’s anger, norms, or
personality. Allemand & Steiner focus specifically on the importance of age in
forgiveness, exploring the potential reasons that age is so strongly correlated with an
ability to forgive.
Sensitivity to injustice also depends on the role one plays in an unjust situation,
and what individual characteristics predispose individuals to be sensitive to injustice
in each of the various roles. Thomas et al. explore how those who are sensitive to
injustice in the role as an observer, beneficiary, or perpetrator of injustice have
many similar characteristics, while those who are sensitive to injustice in the role of
victim differ substantially. Those sensitive to injustice from the victim perspective
are people who are more likely to act in self-interest, less likely to cooperate, more
likely to take more for themselves, and more likely to display anti social and
egotistic behavior. In other words, fear of being a victim is a perspective not of
empathy or guilt but one of selfishness.
The importance of perception of injustice as a mediator is nicely highlighted in
the article on housework (Mikula). The objective injustice of household labor
division might not be very important in and of itself, but perceptions of fairness
(particularly the woman’s) can have a strong impact on marital discord and divorce.
The authors find, amusingly, that there is more marital discord when the woman
thinks housework is unfairly distributed, while there is less marital discord when the
man thinks housework is unfairly distributed. Presumably in both contexts the
woman has more housework, but when she realizes it she is resentful, while when
the man realizes it, he is empathetic. One could imagine perception working as a
similar mediator in many of the other themes brought out in the book, though none
of the articles looked at it so directly or empirically.
As already discussed in the case of punishment, people have a desire to see the
world match their belief in justice. This quest for this consistency is related to one of
the most interesting reoccurring themes in the book: how people’s belief in justice
can, perversely, lead to injustice. Some chapters (Jost et al.) discuss how people
redefine justice to match with reality, even when reality itself is unjust. Other
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chapters (Dalbert) deal with how believing in a just world can lead to condoning
injustice, for example, blaming the victim or assuming unequal compensation is
actually indicative of unequal success or effort. In other words, one’s anger at
injustice can lead to even greater injustice.
Maes et al. offers a literature review on ‘‘just world’’ research, with the authors
dividing the literature into two periods: an initial period through the late 1980s and a
second period from the 1990s onward. Research in the first period focuses on how
those people who believe the world is just are more likely to ignore the victims of
injustice. Research in the second period focuses on the positive aspects of believing
in a just world, such as a willingness to invest in the future, personal resilience, and
a framework for a meaningful life. The authors then review the most recent research
that tests for the co-existence of both correlations from the first and the second
research eras within a single data set. This research does indeed find that believing
the world is just is correlated with both blaming the victim and individual resilience.
In other words, people are consistent. From a normative perspective we might prefer
a sort of ‘‘inconsistency’’ where people believe the world is just towards them (and
thus strive) but not for others (and thus sympathize).
The authors make an excellent critique of this area of research; pointing out that
the typically used survey measures fail to capture the nuance of what a ‘‘just world’’
means. Surely people see the world as unjust and just simultaneously. The world is
unjust in that we are born to rich or poor families or with a disability, we have
unequal natural abilities, and our lives are shaped by random accidents like being
run over by a car or meeting someone who offers us a great job. But within the
injustice and randomness of life, there is also some scope for control and thus for a
‘‘just world.’’We can study, work hard, take care of our health, and invest in
relationships, and reasonably expect that by taking these actions, we will improve
the probability of having a successful, happy and healthy life. Rawls would say, this
is not ‘‘just desserts’’ but ‘‘reasonable expectations.’’ This research simplifies the
complex process of life into an overly simplistic assertion for use on surveys and the
correlates this simplistic statement with people’s opinions and actions. The use of
this conflated survey question does not, of course, mean that people are unable
combine empathy for victims (an understanding of the arbitrary nature of the world)
with hard work and striving (reasonable expectations).
The most interesting section of ‘‘Justice and Conflict’’ arises indirectly in this
same chapter. Maes et al.’s two-period view of the literature raises questions about
how historical context drives the questions we ask and, consequently, our scientific
discoveries. The first era of research, so focused on humans’ ability to ignore
injustice, seems strongly shaped by the post WWII era. This research was, after all
conducted in the same era as the Milgram experiments and other social psychology
studies that tried to understand how the Holocaust could happen given that the
average person’s conception of morality would condemn what took place. This era
focused on understanding why people let horrible things happen and why we allow
social injustice to occur. The preoccupation with injustice, fairness, and oppression
slowly waned in the 1970s, transforming into the materialism of the 1980s and then
the Generation X 1990s, both decades focused on the individual. At this time the
research questions also shifted. Suddenly researchers weren’t looking to link justice
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with oppression but instead to link justice with the individual’s strength and success.
As much as the research says something about people’s belief in a just world, it also
says something about the nature of social science research. In part, we find what we
are looking for because we even think to pose particular questions.
What have we learned reading ‘‘Justice and Conflicts’’? The book offers a clear
introduction to the general problems in justice and conflict research, an excellent
overview of justice and conflict in the abstract, and several interesting empirical
examples on the scope and definition of justice, the ways we perceive injustice,
reactions to justice conflicts, and post-conflict resolution.
What the book lacks, even as a handbook, is cohesiveness. Each author takes an
independent approach, writing about their topic, but it is not clear how they connect
and there is no clear take-away. For example, the chapter on housework is an
interesting introduction to the issue how perceptions of injustice mediate whether
action in reaction to in justice, but no other chapter takes up the issue. Another
example is that the book illustrates that once an injustice is recognized there are
many potential positive and negative, forward and backward looking responses, but
it is not clear why different injustices lead to different reactions. Finishing the
volume, the reader is left with the impression that one of the key arguments is that
justice is a complicated concept, changing as the community itself evolves. After so
much general discussion the reader is hungry to learn how definitions of just
procedure and just distribution changed; what historical events, cultural, demo-
graphic, and economic shifts shape the shifting consensus on definitions and scope
and reparations?
Perhaps a second future volume could take up where this volume left off, offering
a broad empirical examination linking together the various themes introduced in this
volume, and integrating the different examples into specific themes related to
conflict justice.
In sum, ‘‘Justice and Conflicts’’ is a broad introduction to the area of justice
conflicts. It will surely be of interest to those researchers in the area of justice and
conflicts, and individual chapters might be used for courses on specific justice
themes, like environmental or penal justice. Nevertheless it is currently a collection
of papers on environmental conflicts, genocide, conspiracy theories, marital conflict,
penal punishment, and employee–employer relationships. Hopefully a future
volume with link these themes together offering a clear picture of how justice
conflicts have evolved over time.
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